

In addition to conducting security vulnerability analysis and security countermeasure development, the DTIRP is also designed to facilitate heightened security awareness. The chairperson of the DTIRP accomplishes this by providing training and materials to security personnel, co-chairing an interagency Treaty OPSEC committee, providing instruction at the DOD Security Institute, and participating in committees such as the DOD Special Access Program Working Group, the Acquisition Systems Protections Working Group, and the START, CWC and Open Skies Implementation Working Groups.

For Open Skies, the DTIRP has focused on pre-flight equipment inspection, pre-flight route analysis, early warning/notification requirements, and post-flight analysis. In the area of pre-flight equipment inspection, support is being provided to determine the best method of conducting pre-flight inspection.

Preflight route analysis is focused on being able to identify US sites susceptible to a given overflight. To accomplish this task, the DTIRP chairperson is working with a contractor to develop an automated analytical "mission planner" which will simulate the flight of an Open Skies aircraft and depict its sensor footprint on the ground. Through the integration of a site database, the sites located within the footprint of a given sensor would then be identified. This identification will include sensor coverage by type and number of times imaged, angle of image, light conditions and expected resolution. This will allow us to predict site coverage and thereby support early warning/notification.

Early warning notification is driven by national level guidance. The On-Site Inspection Agency, as for other treaties, will provide the initial notification to senior level addressees (i.e., services, agencies). For Open Skies, OSIA notification subsequently will include actual route information. To support this requirement, the "mission planner" will be able to provide route plots and message/report products. A second study to examine the feasibility of incorporating an autodialer capability into the "mission planner" is also underway. The autodialer, which would be capable of dialing various communications instruments such as phones, beepers, and facsimile machines, could permit transmittal of real-time notifications to sites to be overflown.

The last area DTIRP is developing is post-flight analysis, which is basically broken into two phases: short-term analysis which concentrates on the immediate effects on a site, and long-term pattern analysis which looks at many issues, such as numbers of times imaged, route patterns, and sensor coverage. This analysis takes into consideration and fuses all-source site and threat information. To accomplish this, the data collected per event by the "mission planner" is routed to the DTIRP Treaty database for long-term analysis.

As analysis is conducted under the DTIRP, site information is factored into a risk assessment process to cover physical security, communications, operations security, imagery, technology transfer, industrial and open-source issues. Some of the most critical facets of future operations will be derived from this post-flight analysis.

#### FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

**Question.** Which former Soviet Republics have not signed the Open Skies Treaty? Have any of these new states shown an interest in joining the Open Skies Treaty? Would these states be interested in collaborating in joint flights with Russia, or other former Soviet Republics?

**Answer.** Article XVII, Para 3 of the Treaty facilitates the participation of all FSU states. It provides that any of the following states which have not signed the Treaty: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (which has signed), Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—may accede to the Treaty as original signatories at any time, including prior to entry into force, with the deposit of an instrument of accession with one of the depositaries. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia are among the 25 original signatories. Several former Soviet Republics have shown an interest in signing the Treaty but have not yet done so; the U.S. and other signatories have been urging them to sign it as soon as possible.

As members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the eight former Soviet Republics (as well as Georgia) might be interested in joint flights with the Belarus/Russian group of states, particularly since they may not possess the requisite technological and financial means of exercising their future rights under the Treaty independently. Alternatively, some of these former Soviet Republics might consider joint arrangements among themselves or with other European states parties.

#### START MONITORING BY BELARUS AND UKRAINE

**Question.** In what ways would monitoring by Belarus and Ukraine under the Open Skies Treaty be useful to monitor the START Treaty? Has this argument been presented to officials of Kazakhstan?

**Answer.** The START Treaty provides for a number of ways to monitor the limitations it imposes, including exchanges of data, notifications, on-site inspection, telemetry tape exchanges, cooperative measures, and monitoring by national technical means (NTM) of verification. The Treaty on Open Skies would provide all states of the former Soviet Union signing or acceding to the Treaty a means of viewing US facilities. For example, they could use Open Skies missions to learn the status of ICBM silos, the number of heavy bombers at an airfield, or the number of SSBNs in port.

Further, Ukraine, which already is a signatory of the Open Skies Treaty, and any other states of the FSU which accede to the Treaty, could use Open Skies missions to monitor the strategic offensive arms of Russia, if they are able to negotiate active quotas over Russia. They also could obtain such information from observation flights conducted over Russia by other states parties. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have pledged to become non-nuclear weapon states by the end of the START reduction period (seven years following entry into force). Ukrainian officials, in particular, have expressed concern over Russian intentions and have asked for security guarantees. Belarus already has formed a group of states parties with Russia for Open Skies implementation but could acquire data from the flights of other participants, if concerns arose under START. Having the opportunity to use Open Skies to view Russian forces could reduce the security concerns of these three non-Russian states. We have urged Kazakhstan to sign or accede to the Open Skies Treaty, pointing out the benefits of the Treaty over a wide range of issues.

#### CYPRUS

**Question.** What is the present status of Cyprus with respect to the Open Skies Treaty? How will an application by Cyprus be handled by the Open Skies Consultative Commission?

**Answer.** The United States supports formal accession to the Treaty on Open Skies by all interested CSCE states, and without geographical restrictions. Article XVII, Paragraph 4 of the Treaty provides that after entry into force of the Treaty, any non-signatory CSCE member state may apply for accession by submitting a written request to one of the depositaries. Such states may also request allocation of a passive quota. The Treaty provides that the matter will then be considered at the next regular meeting of the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

The NATO allies and all the members of the former Warsaw Pact participated in the negotiation of the Treaty and are considered original signatories. All of the other states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including Cyprus, were invited to observe the negotiation of the Treaty, and may observe the meetings of the OSCC. Many of the observer states are eager to apply for full participation in the treaty as soon as possible.

Cyprus was also among the observer states which approved the Open Skies political declaration which accompanied the signing of the treaty at the CSCE Review Conference in Helsinki.

#### OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD

**Question.** Have any nations outside of Europe and North America shown an interest in acceding to the Open Skies Treaty? Would Open Skies inspections be useful in reducing threats and building confidence in the Middle East and in the Indian Subcontinent?

**Answer.** Article XVII, paragraph 5 of the Treaty provides that six months after entry into force of the Treaty, the Open Skies Consultative Commission may consider the accession of any State, which, in the judgment of the Commission, is able and willing to contribute to the objectives of the Treaty. As the Treaty has not yet entered into force, it is too early for non-signatories to request accession to the Treaty, and none has expressed a formal interest in doing so.

The Treaty on Open Skies is founded on four basic principles: complete territorial openness and access, the use of unarmed aircraft for observation flights, a diverse sensor suite, and annual quotas for overflights. These principles allow the creation of a confidence-building regime which permits parties to inform themselves about military forces and activities of concern to them. In other regions, such as the Indian Subcontinent or the Middle East, the same basic concept of openness, and the techniques developed in the Treaty on Open Skies, could be an important element in the reduction of regional tensions and in building confidence.

#### CBO ESTIMATES

**Question.** Could the CBO Open Skies annual flight cost estimate be presented in more detail so that the estimate relates to flights/year and the "taxi" option?

Answer. The CBO estimate for Open Skies operating and support costs was based on Air Force historical experience using C-135 aircraft on missions similar to those expected for Open Skies and not on an estimate of a given number of flights/year. The CBO used a figure of 2,000 flight hours per year, which was based on a projection of three Open Skies aircraft. Current U.S. Government policy is to dedicate at least one aircraft to the Open Skies mission. The dedicated C-135 aircraft will use an estimated 740 flight hours per aircraft annually whether or not they are ever used in an actual Open Skies overflight. The flight hour estimate used by the CBO is based upon actual reliability, operational support, and operational employment experience roughly equivalent to expected Open Skies needs. The flight hour estimate includes the support flying hours necessary to ensure essential operational capabilities such as aircrew proficiency, system reliability, and sensor calibration. Air Force experience shows that support hours to prepare for operational missions often exceed operational hours by a factor of 3 to 10 times the actual operational hours.

An estimate of treaty flight cost can be made, but it will be dependent on a number of variables that will change with actual experience. Film supply and type, sensor operation, location of the country, duration of the sortie, and need for backup support will all affect mission flight cost. A current Air Force/OSIA estimate is that a 10-hour Open Skies sortie over Russia would cost approximately \$100 to \$150 thousand. With respect to "taxi" flights, the operational costs of a "taxi" flight will be passed to the observing state, and Air Force aircraft may be used to transport the observation team to and from Point of Entry/Exit. Therefore, we anticipate little difference to actual cost whether or not a "taxi" option is exercised.